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Abstract
This Essay consists of five parts. Part I locates the Agreement in a series of constitutional
attempts to resolve the “Irish question” from 1971 onwards, arguing that the Agreement is both
similar to, yet fundamentally different from, other settlement propositions. Part II introduces the
reader to the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (or ”NIWC”), saying something of its founding
rationale and environment before considering its priorities for the political process in which it
found itself immersed in May 1996. Part III further outlines the role that the NIWC assumed in
that process, and its modus operandi, going on to describe the ideas that it inserted in the process
and the Agreement itself. Part IV of this Essay offers an assessment of the Agreement, six months
later, in both abstract and actual terms. Finally, drawing on contemporary empirical experience
in Northern Ireland, as well as models presented by conflict resolution practitioners and theorists,
Part V attempts to harvest any lessons that may be transferable from our process to others. To
begin, this Essay outlines a whistlestop tour of past proposals, pausing to reflect on the parameters
of the question–unionism versus nationalism–in every case until the Agreement.
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INTRODUCTION
In offering an explanation of the Agreement reached ini-
tially on Good Friday, April 10, 1998, and subsequently ratified
by referendum on May 22, 1998-the Good Friday Agreement1
(or "Agreement")-this Essay consists of five parts. Part I locates
the Agreement in a series of constitutional attempts to resolve
the "Irish question" from 1971 onwards, arguing that the Agree-
ment is both similar to, yet fundamentally different from, other
settlement propositions. Part II introduces the reader to the
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (or "NIWC"), saying some-
thing of its founding rationale and environment before consid-
ering its priorities for the political process in which it found itself
immersed in May 1996. Part III further outlines the role that the
NIWC assumed in that process, and its modus operandi, going on
to describe the ideas that it inserted in the process and the
Agreement itself. Part IV of this Essay offers an assessment of the
Agreement, six months later, in both abstract and actual terms.
Finally, drawing on contemporary empirical experience in
Northern Ireland, as well as models presented by conflict resolu-
tion practitioners and theorists, Part V attempts to harvest any
lessons that may be transferable from our process to others. To
begin, this Essay outlines a whistlestop tour of past proposals,
pausing to reflect on the parameters of the question-unionism
versus nationalism-in every case until the Agreement.
Commenting on the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreemen-t
in 1985,2 the then Tanaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs in
* Kate Fearon is currently Political Advisor to the Women's Coalition Assembly
Team, having been part of the Women's Coalition team, which negotiated the Agree-
ment. Both authors share interests in issues of equality and human rights.
** Monica McWilliams is an elected member of the new Northern Ireland Assem-
bly, established under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which she was
heavily involved in negotiating.
1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Good Friday Agreement].
2. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
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the Republic of Ireland, Dick Spring, said that he viewed the
effort as something of a process that had started with the "first
hands across the border effort" by Sean Lemass in 1965.'
Lemass's visit to Stormont in 1965 marked a watershed in North-
South relations, and a reading of recent cabinet papers under-
lines the loss of twenty-five years of potential development that
the Lemass-O'Neill meetings might have made possible.4 This
denotes the beginning of a period, which Whyte described as
being of an "unprecedented pace of change." 5 It also struck the
somber template for all the attempts at progress that were to
occur over the next thirty years, culminating in the endorsement
of the Good Friday Agreement by referenda, North and South,
in 1998. The template was comprised of five phases:
(i) initial dialogue between governments;
(ii) involvement of established "constitutional" political
parties;
(iii) development of events on the ground outside govern-
mental control that rendered impossible continuation
of discussion;
(iv) a "cooliig off" period of around five years; and
(v) resumed dialogue close to where prior initiatives had
broken down,
The very first round of talks set the pattern. On the day
after the first meeting convened by Brian Faulkner, on July 8,
1971, the SDLP, though it commented favorably on the process,
found it impossible to return after the Stormont parliament re-
fused to order an inquiry into the controversial deaths of Cusack
and Beattie in the midst of four days rioting in Derry.
There followed a series of British 'government white and
green papers, beginning with Harold Wilson's six point plan, an-
nounced on September 8, 1971.6 All these papers, including the
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985,
U.K.-Ir., Cmnd. 9657, reprinted in TOM HADDEN & KEVIN BOYLE, THE ANGLO-IRIsH AGREE-
MENT 15-48 (1989) [hereinafter Anglo-Irish Agreement].
3. IRISH TIMES, Nov. 16, 1985.
4. State Papers from 1965, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 1-2, 1996.
5. T.W. MOODY & F.K. MARTIN, THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY 342 (1993).
6. This paper was followed by the GREEN PAPER ON THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PAR-
LIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1971). Similar papers-THE FUTURE
OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1972), NORTHERN IRELAND: CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS FOR
THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (1974), the related NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTION ACT
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outcome of the Sunningdale Conference of December 1973, re-
worked at least one of the proposals in antecedent papers. For
example, the Wilson Plan envisioned election by proportional
representation, a council of Ireland, and consideration of Irish
Unity. These prefigure the Council of Ireland proposed in the
White Paper of 1973.
Other proposals that were to become standard in subse-
quent documents included increased security cooperation,
North and South; ajoint British-Irish Intergovernmental Council
in various forms; a Bill of Rights; a distinction between executive
and administrative powers; increased cooperation on economic
issues; internal power-sharing of some type; and the recognition
of a special relationship between Northern Ireland and the Re-
public. In the 1980s, other reports would follow, incorporating
many of these elements and updating them.7
This set of papers might have fizzled out in the same man-
ner as those of the 1970s had it not been both for the perceived
need of the Irish government to head off increasing support for
Sinn Fain in electoral politics after the hunger strikes of 1981-
1982, and to bolster the SDLP, and for an increase in the tech-
nological ability of the IRA to inflict real pain upon the British
government. A change in status from a "weak but restive minor-
ity ' is borne out by the arms acquisition from Libya in 1987, and
the strategic and tactical change to a cellular military structure
by the IRA.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement was an amalgam of all the pro-
posals offered from the beginning of the conflict. It was hugely
ambitious and deeply ambiguous. But it was destined to floun-
der because of the exclusive process of its imposition.9 Mary
(1973), and a further NORTHERN IRELAND ACT (1974)-sealed the "temporary" direct
rule.
7. These reports include THE THATCHER-HAUGHEY SUMMIT (May 1980), the ANGLO-
IRISH GOVERNMENTAL COUNCIL/JOINT STUDIES (Nov. 1981), the "ROLLING DEVOLUTION"
PROPOSALS OFJIM PRIOR (Apr. 1982), the NEW IRELAND FORUM REPORT (May 1984), the
KILBRANDON REPORT (Nov. 1984), the WAY FORWARD (1984), the HAGGERUP REPORT AND
WHAT FUTURE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND-APNI REPORT (July 1985), IRELAND-A Post-
TIVE PROPOSAL (Hadden & Boyle, July 1985), and the ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT (1985).
8. SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 231 (Q. Hoare &
G. Nowel Smith eds., 1971).
9. In the run to the signing, the Irish governmental team of elected representatives
and civil servants consulted with nationalists in Northern Ireland and gave notice to the
Vatican in September 1985. Unionists did not enjoy such a relationship with their "big
brother" in the negotiations. It has been suggested by O'Leary and McGarry that Pais-
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Robinson, who resigned from the Irish Labour party over the
issue, noted that "[t] he Anglo-Irish Agreement might have been
all right as far as the two governments were concerned, but I was
right to say it would push the two communities further apart...
[and] time has proved me right."10 The Downing Street Decla-
ration a" and Framework Documents,12 also produced by the
political elites, set out updated aspirations, but effectively only
tinkered with the system, drawing on many of the earlier struc-
tural propositions to do so. These were all gradualist measures
of containment, i.e., of management of the conflict. They were
not measures that could ever transform the conflict. The
London Independent leader on the publication of the 1989 review
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement illustrates the point, stating that
these measures have become "part of the political furniture. Yet
no-one has been able to show that [they have] been particularly
useful piece [s] of furniture. No transformation of the situation
within the province has taken place. It enables London and
Dublin to talk to each other without using a megaphone. 13
I. THE NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN'S COALITION:
CONTEXT AND CONCEPTION
More talks had been convened by the then Secretary of
State, Patrick Mayhew, in 1992, but they broke up without resolu-
tion-even though the UUP had travelled to Dublin to negotiate
for the first time. The climate after the paramilitary cease-fires
of 1994 enabled a new process to be developed. On February
28, 1996, the British and Irish governments issued a Joint Com-
muniqu6 announcing the convening of All Party Talks ("Talks")
for the purpose of deliberating on the future of Northern Ire-
land and its relationships with its nearest neighbors. They in-
vited advice as to the method of election or selection of partici-
pants to those Talks, viewed almost universally as being of mas-
sive importance.
The following month, one of the leading women's non-gov-
ernmental organizations ("NGOs"), the Northern Ireland Wo-
ley and Molyneaux were offered the opportunity to see a draft of the agreement, but
only under Privy Council, which they refused.
10. SUNDAY TRIBUNE (Dublin), May 28, 1989.
11. Cmnd. 2442.
12. A New Framework for Agreement Dec. 1994, 34 I.L.M. 946 (1995).
13. INDEPENDENT (London), May 25, 1989.
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men's European Platform ("NIWEP"), responded to the govern-
ment's invitation with a paper' 4 detailing how the proposed
Talks could be gender-proofed. This paper was also circulated
to all political parties. The themes laid out in the NIWEP docu-
ment were ones constantly revisited by the NIWC in the coming
two years; equality of opportunity, treatment, and outcome in
political structures and substance were the goals that the paper
argued could only come about with meaningful participation of
women. The paper also struck the template for the as yet un-
formed NIWC, and indeed, this principle of inclusion would be-
come a cornerstone of the Agreement. This principle initially
pertained to the perspective of women, but later developed to
involve other important voices, specifically Sinn Fain, the Ulster
Democratic Party ("UDP"), and the Progressive Unionist Party
("PUP").
The paper from the NIWEP did not emerge from a vacuum.
It is generally recognized that large numbers of women have for
many years involved themselves with grassroots and voluntary
sector campaigns, holding the fabric .of society together while
the conflict threatened to rend it asunder.' 5 The competing na-
tionalisms of the conflict reinforced the conservative nature of
the society and perpetuated patriarchal norms. "The traditional
link between nationalism (both orange and green) and their re-
spective churches has ensured that the ultra-conservative view of
women as both the property of, and the inferior of, men, re-
mains strongly entrenched in Irish society."16 Women's employ-
ment patterns, though changing, still reflect traditional roles;
women are concentrated in a small number of (usually) lower-
paid occupations.
For women, advances in the elected political arena did not
follow establishing a foothold in the world of paid labor. Out of
eighteen Members of Parliament elected to Westminster, none
are women. Out of three representatives sent to the European
Parliament, none are women. And only fourteen percent of lo-
cal government representatives are women. In the late 1980s,
14. NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN'S EUROPEAN PLATFORM, GENDER PROOFING THE
ELECTION SYSTEM AND TALKS (Belfast, Mar. 19, 1996).
15. Carmel Roulston, Did Women Make a Difference? The Northern Ireland Wo-
men's Coalition in the Peace Process 2 (1998) (unpublished conference paper).
16. Monica McWilliams, The Church, the State and the Women's Movement in Northern
Ireland, in THE IRISH WOMEN'S STUDIES READER (Ailbhe Smyth ed., 1993).
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some political parties began to establish programs to increase
women's representation both within the party and as candidates
for elections, but women remain a long way away from having
meaningful influence in any party.17
This situation has contributed in part to women establishing
their own networks, within and across communities, as well as
region-wide. Since the mid-1970s, women's centers have been
established in many communities, initially as a result of feminist
groups.' 8 The number of women's centers grew exponentially
in the 1980s, providing space where women could seek advice
and meet other women. In the 1990s, the activities of the wo-
men's centers developed to incorporate education and training
programs-both labor market, and further and higher educa-
tion, orientated. Some of these programs also included consid-
eration of women and political life in Northern Ireland. The
demand for, and demands of, these centers have diversified in
recent years, and women leaders have adapted to the changing
demands by seeking new sources of funding: government, the
European Union, charitable foundations, and private donations.
In these networks, women have proved effective negotiators, in-
fluencing policy and drawing down resources directly from the
government and other sources to sustain their activities. But, as
Carmel Roulston notes:
While women's development is regarded as essential for com-
munity development in general, it appears often to be seen as
a means of allowing women to become a 'resource', an influ-
ence for stability, rather than to encourage women to partici-
pate on equal terms in the formulation of goals and strategies
for the community.' 9
In the wake of the 1994 paramilitary cease-fires, it was not
just the governments that were cultivating new political
processes. Several consultative conferences were convened, cre-
ating the space for women involved in these networks and
groups to come together and to give voice to their aspirations for
the community as a whole, and to try to find ways in which these
aspirations could be impressed on decision-makers. Shortly after
17. See Roulston, supra note 15. Among parties that have made special, if currently
ineffective, provision for women are the SDLP, the PUP, the APNI, and Sinn Fin.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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this point, the window of opportunity for women opened with
the two governments' Joint Communiqu6.
When the British Government published its proposals20
based on the consultation exercise, the NIWEP responded with
another paper,2' circulating it again to the governments and all
political parties. But the other parties were not interested in
profiling women, or even acknowledging the "stabilizing re-
source" role that women had played in the community over the
years. They did not respond to the NIWEP position papers.22
The NIWEP had more success with lobbying the British Govern-
ment, which agreed to space for a woman's caucus to contest the
elections should women wish to make a formal intervention in
the political arena. For many of the women activists who had
been involved for many years in informal politics, in communi-
ties, across networks, and in the workplace, this would be a com-
pletely new departure, and one of which many were fearful. At a
large meeting of over 100 activists on April 17, 1996, however,
the NIWEP decided to participate formally in this political sys-
tem that many mistrusted, or feared, over the past quarter cen-
tury. The failure of political parties to respond to the NIWEP
briefing papers demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the value
of a woman's perspective in the Talks process, the value of bring-
ing and building on the experiences of the many years of cross-
community work directly into the Tilks. And so, the women
who had navigated and negotiated grassroots politics for many
years took matters into their own hands. They were not the first
group of women to embark on such a gender-specific interven-
tion into the formal arena in advance of political talks about
their future, and they may not be the last,23 but, uniquely in the
20. There were two papers: THE FRAMEWORK FOR A BROADLY ACCEPTABLE PROCESS
LEADING TO ALL PARTY NEGOTIATIONS and DESIGNATION OF PARTIES FOR THE FORTHCOM-
ING ELECTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND (HMSO, Belfast, Mar. 26, 1996). The papers fa-
vored a complex system with designated political parties and a two-tiered party list sys-
tem. The holding of an election to determine participants would be of key importance,
and it is worth noting that elections were an unpopular route for established parties,
particularly nationalists.
21. BRONAGH HINDS, NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN'S EUROPEAN PLATFORM, DESIGNA-
TION OF PARTIES FOR THE FORTHCOMING ELECTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A RESPONSE BY
NIWEP ON BEHALF OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND (Apr. 10, 1996).
22. The only two parties to acknowledge receipt were Democratic Left and Sinn
F6in.
23. In other peace processes, women have drawn on an identity as women to pur-
sue a common political agenda, most notably in South Africa, and also in Nicaragua.
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history of Irish or British politics, they constituted a cross-com-
munity group of women that intervened in the previously male-
dominated process by contesting the election for delegates to
the Talks as an all-women's coalition, the NIWC.
The NIWC had a deliberate cross-community base. In the
Northern Ireland context, this means that the NIWC has women
from both nationalist and republican traditions, in the main, but
not exclusively Catholic, and from unionist and loyalist commu-
nities, in the main, but not exclusively Protestant, as well as wo-
men who hover between these cultures, rejecting either identity.
In its infancy, the NIWC agreed to three core principles: inclu-
sion, equality, and human rights. Taken together, these princi-
ples formed an "ethical framework" by which internal and exter-
nal business was conducted. They proved strong tools by which
to navigate and to accommodate the internal and external polit-
ical interests of the women who came together; what happened
internally in the ranks of the NIWC was a microcosom of what
had to happen externally.
This "Do It Yourself' brand of politics did work out for the
women involved. The election system, designed by the British
Government to secure an electoral outcome that would be inclu-
sive of the smaller loyalist parties who had proved instrumental
in securing and maintaining the paramilitary cease-fires, also
found a place for the NIWC.
II. PRIORITIES FOR THE PROCESS
From the outset, the NIWC declared that it was not going
into talks in defense of a fixed constitutional position. It was
concerned with both the interests, not the positions, of others
and how these interests might be accommodated within the
NIWC's own ethical framework of human rights, equality, and
inclusion. In the view of all the other parties, this position was
novel, if not naive. For the NIWC, it was better to have a differ-
ent view of the possible in the given political norm and to work
towards it than to declare the probable and to wait for others to
share that view. From its core principles of human rights and
Shelia Meinjtes, Gender, Nationalism and Transformation: Differnece and Commonality in
South Africa's Past and Present, in WOMEN, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM-THE POLITICS OF
TRANSITION (Rick Wilford & Robert Miller eds., 1998); KATE FEARON, WOMEN'S WORK-
THE STORY OF THE NI WOMEN'S COALITION BLACSTAFF (forthcoming 1999).
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equality, the NIWC argued that any political settlement must rec-
ognize the realities of governing a divided society-and not a
society that just happened to endure an aggravated twenty-eight-
year crime wave.24
Parties to the Northern Irish negotiation had a tendency to
spend most of their time and effort determining if any agree-
ment was possible, rather than trying to devise a comprehensive
and creative agreement. Membership of the "Talks Club" was
expected to fluctuate, and did so. When the DUP and UKUP
were participants, Sinn Fin was debarred.2 5 But they left in ad-
vance of Sinn Fin's admittance in September 1997. The UDP
was expelled for a short time in early 1998,26 as were Sinn Fin.
The process was continually questioned and undermined, both
by present and past participants.
One of the roles that the NTWC engaged in very seriously
was as advocates and protectors of the process. The NIWC
placed an unequalled emphasis on getting the process right and
believing in it. While patently process should never impede pro-
gress, the N1WC always raised the issue. In fact, when parties
were asked to offer the values and principles that they believed
should be adhered to for each of the agenda items, the NIWC
was the only party to propose additional collective principles for
the process. For the NIWC, there was never a question of if there
is an agreement. It was always there will be an agreement, even in
the face of much negativity from all the political commentators
and, in late 1997-early 1998, a fearful and dangerous climate on
the streets as a consequence of the UDA/LVF murder campaign.
The NIWC exercised its belief in the possibility of an out-
come both inside and outside the Talks process. By constantly
engaging in an elliptic loop that involved the British and Irish
governments, the Talks chairs, the other participants, and mem-
bers of civic society, from grassroots community organizations to
business and trade unionists, the NIWC was always well ap-
24. These positions represent an essential cleavage in negotiating approaches dur-
ing much of the Talks process. In the main, Unionism approached the problem from a
law and order perspective, and nationalism from a conflict resolution perspective.
25. This was due to the collapse of the 1994 IRA cease-fire with the Canary Wharf
bombing in February 1996.
26. They were expelled when the Talks moved to Lancaster House, London in
February 1998 because of the UDA/LVF murder campaign that ran from approxi-
mately December 1997-January 1998.
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praised of what was, or might be, "the acceptable" on any given
question.
This constant communication with the external community
allowed the N1WC to provide resources for the Talks on two
planes. First, members of the NIWC became a trusted source of
information and advice for the independent Talks chairs and as-
sisted them both to take judgment calls on specific issues and to
present general options for the participants. Second, the NIWC
submitted for change and refinement the ideas of the NIWC to
those persons likely to be most affected by the particular aspect
of any outcome for critique. Many members of the NIWC had
come from, or were working in, the vibrant community and vol-
untary sectors, and these contacts were optimally utilized. Many
of these groups had been successful lobbyists, dealing directly
with the British and European parliaments for many years. But
there were limits on lobbying for ideas to be inserted into the
Talks process. In making the leap from the informal to the for-
mal political arena, the NIWC was able to be a more effective
agent of change in that environment. This new situation, with
all its potential for efficacy, also has limits, in the degree of dilu-
tion of sound ideas and in the compromises necessary for agree-
ment. Nonetheless, by straddling the tension between the infor-
mal and formal arena, the NIWC was able to generate many op-
tions on the multifarious aspects of the Agreement, without
being wed to one in particular.
What the NIWC lacked in size, it made up for by forming
and maintaining strategic alliances both inside and outside the
formal process. This may have been possible because its party
structure, such as it was, more closely followed the looser U.S.
system, which allows for a wide spectrum of conservatism and
liberalism in both the Republican Party and the Democratic
Party, rather than the Northern Ireland system. The Northern
Ireland party system environment is tightly closed and fiercely
competitive, and there is a strong linear relationship between
the constant assertion of the primacy of the ballot box, any sub-
sequent mandate, and a concomitant "party line" in seeking sup-
port for, or confirming continued support of, that mandate.
This is not to say that the "party line" is never traversed-it is-
but to note that much value is placed on party loyalty, often to
the detriment of conscience or external influence.
The NIWC was able to evade or at least to elude the stunting
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effect of group-think because of its heterogeneity, and the core-
principles framework that guided its participation. There are, of
course, limits to what one party can do, even given an instinctive
bent for innovation, but the NIWC, in attempting to broaden
ownership of the political process and to clarify and communi-
cate the process to the public, laid the ground. for the work that
was to come in the wake of the accord: signposting symbols and
substance in the Agreement that offered everyone an opportu-
nity to be a stakeholder in the future. Apart from concern
about, and being protective of, the process, the N1WC, because
of its links with different and diverse communities, was able to
propose enough tangible ideas and options into which people
could buy.
III. INSERTED IDEAS
For most observers, the kernel of the problem, when it was
defined, was the reconciliation of the two broad constitutional
blocks, unionism and nationalism. At the end of the day,
though, arguably it was not these two blocks that were reconciled
with one another, but rather constitutionalism and a culture of
rights-the embedding of a culture of rights that did not dis-
criminate. Each traded off the other to make it easier to swal-
low. Thus, the rights agenda enabled Sinn Fin to accept and to
sell what is technically, and in the old idiom, a partitionist solu-
tion. So too, the continued existence of the Northern Ireland
region in the United Kingdom enabled the UUP to accept and
to sell the rights agenda in an environment in which they have
denied the need for such rights for many years. It was into this
area that the NIWC was able to propose and to insert successfully
some of its more radical ideas. It was also its analysis that the
eventual deal could not be a deal of the center.
Specifically, the deal would not work if it were cut between
the UUP, the SDLP, with a veneer of cross-community legitimacy
lent by the Alliance Party ("APNI"). All parties to the conflict
had to be included in the process, and each party to the conflict
should be able to point to something of their own reflected in
the outcome. (Politics notwithstanding, there is a logic in this
approach in terms of having something in a document that dif-
ferent factions can sell to their followers. In the Cartesian world
of votes, the math dictates that it all adds up).
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The equality debate, the NIWC argued, not only should be
viewed in terms of the religious divide, but also should apply to
gender, race, disability, and sexuality. It was the principle of in-
clusion, though, that proved to be most controversial for the
NIWC. It argued that a peace settlement stood little chance of
success if one or more of the other parties from the negotiating
table excluded-any party. Hence, while some called for their ex-
clusion, the NIWC valued the presence of the PUP, Sinn F~in,
and the UDP. -'
The notion of a civic forum also originated from the princi-
ple of inclusion. We felt that it was important to extend the
range of citizen involvement in politics by creating a completely
new body that would complement the work of the elected repre-
sentatives through participation and representation from the
various sectors of civil society-community activists, trade unions
and employer bodies, youth groups, and the educational sector.
The NIWC also called for an inclusive electoral system-one that
would cultivate a burgeoning democracy, allowing representa-
tion of newer, smaller voices, and stave off sclerosis of any new
system. The NIWC was the only party proposing to acknowledge
and to seek to redress the rights of victims in the reconciliation
process. With the aim of seeding a culture of tolerance, the
NIWC was the only party to place issues like integrated educa-
tion and the right of women to full and equal political participa-
tion on the agenda. Similarly, it introduced clauses in the Agree-
ment that recognized the positive role that mixed housing can
play in reconciliation; the particular difficulties that young peo-
ple from areas directly affected by the Troubles will continue to
face, and the resources for community based initiatives to ad-
dress these difficulties; the link between community develop-
ment and social inclusion; and the link between women's in-
volvement in public life and social inclusion.
The NIWC also argued that the early release and reintegra-
tion of politically-motivated prisoners is a necessary part of any
settlement, that solid community infrastructure combats social
exclusion, and that there should be a comprehensive independ-
ent review of the police service. All of these, with the exception
of the electoral system, made it into the final draft document.
While the NIWC had listened to the voices from the Northern
Ireland communities and NGOs, many of the ideas that articu-
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lated these concerns came from international papers and
processes.
The notion of the Civic Forum had its origin and was pro-
posed as a part amalgam of the French Regional Economic and
Social Committees, the Irish Economic and Social Forum, the
Irish Senate, and the Northern Irish Partnership Boards. The
inclusion of gender participation echoed the South African con-
stitutional accord, while the language in the Agreement articu-
lating it came from the Report of the U.N. Fourth Conference
on the Status of Women, held in China in 1996. The idea for
recognizing and providing for community development came
from local experience. The language came from the Guatema-
lan peace process, accessed online.
IV. THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN
The Agreement offers the greatest potential for contempo-
rary and historical resolution of "the Irish question" since the
Act of Union. It is not a panacea for all of our ills, but it gives us
the chance to construct a new, inclusive society for this genera-
tion and generations to come. Very few societies have such a
tabula rasa presented to them. And the referendum that was put
to the people six weeks after the deal was delivered was a fiercely
contested affair. Despite the best efforts of political parties and a
conglomerate of NGOs and individuals to mount a collaborative,
collective "Yes" campaign, the fissures of old had not dissipated
sufficiently, and the broad "Yes" vote struggled to get its message
heard.
The media was of particular difficulty, preferring to report
the best efforts of the "No" campaign-largely run by dissident
UUP members, the DUP, and the UKUP, designed to stir up
fear, hurt, and resentment. 27 While the parties who subscribed
to the deal were struggling to produce it, those who had left the
process were setting the agenda in the media-effectively, the
"No" campaign began long before there was any agreement, and
when it became more pronounced, the emotional manipulation
was manifest in their slogan: "Have a heart for Ulster."
It was thus an uphill struggle to consolidate and to cam-
paign on the "Yes" ground, but in the end it came together. The
27. See QUINTIN OLIVER, WORKING FOR YES (The Yes Campaign, Dec. 1998).
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Agreement posed real difficulty for particular groupings in
Northern Ireland. For all the constitutional complexities that it
addressed, these complexities were not the issues that the cam-
paign was fought on. The issues were, as ever where treaties in-
volve people, of human concern. Prisoner release and victims
became the debating faultlines. The release on parole of promi-
nent prisoners like Michael Stone, who aligned with the UDA in
prison and appeared at the UDP "Yes" rally in the Ulster Hall,
and the Balcombe St. Gang, who appeared at the Sinn Fain Ard
Fheis (conference) in Dublin, shook the "soft no" unionist vot-
ers-those who did not really like the agreement, but who were
prepared to give it a go because there was nothing else-to the
core. The "No" campaign played on these fears and had pre-
pared a series of scaremongering negative newspaper advertise-
ments for the final week of the campaign. The Stone and
Balcombe St. Gang appearances, and lauding of prisoners who
had been involved in violent criminal acts, were presented in the
media as triumphant returns. But there were other available ex-
planations. The UDP did not want Stone at their "Yes" rally,
fearing that he would damage the campaign.28 But that apart,
the crowd did. They briefly celebrated his presence, yes-but
not in triumph. In a sense, this was their prisoner, coming home
from the war. The corollary of which is, of course, that the war
was over. The same explanation fits the Balcombe St. Gang ap-
pearance at the Sinn Fain Ard Fheis. The war was over. Prison-
ers were coming home. It confirmed for the NIWC its view, on
receipt of the first draft of the Agreement, that "no one is going
back to war over this document."
There was real dismay after these events, that the referen-
dum would not pass by a substantial enough majority. But it was
the NIWC's conviction that to achieve resolution of any prob-
lem, you had to understand it, and often this meant you had to
wear another's shoes. It was difficult to campaign for "Yes" in
these circumstances, just as it had been difficult to argue for the
inclusion of the UDP in talks at a time when the UDA was con-
ducting its horrific street campaign. But it had to be done. In a
curious way, these big events somewhat took the wind out of the
sails of the "No" campaign's negative advertising. The boil had
28. And arguably it played a factor in the UDP's subsequent unsuccessful election
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been lanced, people had gone into and through the worst parts
of the agreement a week before the vote, not, as the "No" cam-
paign planned, in the week of the vote. And they voted "yes" 29 in
hundreds of thousands: 71.12%.
V. SIX MONTH ASSESSMENT
In looking to our future, it was important to the NIWC that
we should be careful not to lose sight of our past-.not to be
bound by it, but to do right by it. One of the areas most ne-
glected in the years of conflict was the whole areas of victims,
and their rights and needs, both physical and emotional. It was
important to the NIWC that the people who had suffered be-
cause of the Troubles could say that there was "something in it
for me, too." That acknowledgment turned out to be a thin but
firm sinew for many people who the "No" campaign hoped
would be susceptible to the charge that the Agreement was a
"terrorist's charter." As with other provisions that the NIWC
wrote into the Agreement, information for the clauses on victims
came from NGOs who worked outside the process.
It may seem somewhat strange to use an "old-fashioned"
term like "victim." In most feminist and liberal political dis-
course, the notion of "survivor" is a strong and recurrent theme.
So too, though, is the notion of identity politics, autonomy, and
allowing space to self-define. In Northern Ireland, many victims
groups, in all their diversity, had just begun to get off the
ground. The Agreement gave license to their existence and vali-
dated their experience publicly for the first time. Most of these
groups used the term "victim" to describe their particular situa-
tion.
This terminology is something that must be respected,
though it can be exploited. Many people have physical wounds
that continue to require treatment. At one recent gathering
there was a youthful looking man accompanied by his wife. He
was obviously in great pain, constantly shifting position in search
of relief. Neither his crutches nor the pharmaceutical painkil-
lers that he constantly pressured his partner for appeared to
bring any. The pain was so obviously great, we assumed that he
was the victim of a recent punishment attack. But we learned he
29. 676,966 people in Northern Ireland voted "yes."
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had been attacked almost twenty years ago. Dealing with that
level of pain requires enormous emotional reserve, not just from
the victim, but also from their families. We need, and are begin-
ning to acquire, trauma centers that can treat these wounds
medically. But what we also need, and what the Agreement pro-
vides for, is for the community-based groups that provide sup-
port and counselling on either a shoestring budget or purely
with volunteers to be supported by themselves.
Communities have dealt with these problems for many years
themselves, and it is only right that their autonomy, and method-
ologies, should be supported now. This support is happening,
along with other developments, such as the establishment of ed-
ucational bursaries for children who have lost parents or other
relatives. While it is not inconceivable that these would have
happened, in any event, the acknowledgment and resource com-
mitment in the Agreement has already made a difference to the
lives of many victims and survivors.
Other provisions in the Agreement have attracted much at-
tention since the elections to the new Assembly. Including peo-
ple in the process of governance will be an important way of
sustaining the faith that was expressed so explicitly in the May
referendum. The Civic Forum offers great opportunity to de-
velop a participative democracy. Significantly, it has been the
one part of the Agreement that has captured the public's imagi-
nation and generated more unsolicited submissions and ideas
than any other.
The Civic Forum, which will complement the work of the
Assembly, will be a vehicle for, among other things, researching
and presenting the best practice to the Assembly. It should seek
to promote reconciliation and to dedicate itself to ensuring that
the voices of those most disadvantaged and marginalized are
heard. It should seek to harness the creative energies of the
communities in Northern Ireland. This body will be comprised
of sixty people, drawn from various nominating bodies-the um-
brella bodies of business, trade union, and voluntary interests.
The method of the Police Commission, in moving around
Northern Ireland to hear the views of people with regard to the
future of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, has been welcomed in
many quarters as a useful first step. It has been suggested that
the Civic Forum could operate in a similar way-moving around
the region and participating in its operation.
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While the Civic Forum does not have any executive powers,
its influence will come from the inclusivity of its process and the
quality of its output. The Civic Forum will provide a bridge be-
tween past and future practices. In the past, because Northern
Irish elected politicians were not involved in immediate matters
of policy and governance and had virtually no control over budg-
ets-the infamous "democratic deficit"-Northern Ireland's civil
society enjoyed a direct relationship to British government min-
isters. They are used to dealing directly with those who hold the
reins of power. Civil society will thus have to adapt to new rein
holders, and the temptation may be not to value their potential.
It is true to say that Northern Ireland's politicians have many
skills to acquire; they have been unaccustomed to the cut and
thrust of what is recognized as everyday politics in other polities.
Many have little appreciation of bargaining and playing for the
long-term, yet they are cognizant of the skills and values neces-
sary for good governance; the ballot box produces results based
on message, not merit. Many of these skills have been incubat-
ing in civil society throughout the conflict, and there may be a
reluctance to give back what has been hard won.
At the same time, elected politicians need to recognize the
resource that civil society in Northern Ireland has to offer them.
The Civic Forum offers opportunity for a two-way dialogue on
governance and on the manner in which it is administrated. It
also offers new ways of thinking about democracy, exemplifying
in part what Paul Hirst has termed "associational democracy,"
whereby more power is formally devolved to voluntary organiza-
tions, supplementing the more linear, representative democracy.
Hirst envisages:
[t]hat supplement would involve a growth in the scope of
government through associations . .. ; associational govern-
ment would lessen the tasks of central government to such an
extent that greater accountability of both the public power
and of the devolved associational agencies would be possi-
ble .... Associationalism, however, treats such self-governing
voluntary bodies not as 'secondary organisations' but as the
primary means of organising social life.3"
Partnership, like that envisaged between the Civic Forum
30. Paul Hirst, Associational Democracy, in PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 116-17 (David
Held ed., 1993).
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and the elected Assembly members, is not a new concept in
Northern Ireland-the distribution of the European Special
Program for Peace and Reconciliation (the "Peace Package")
money relies on a partnership of elected representatives and
members of community, voluntary, trade union, and private sec-
tor concerns. The Agreement stretches the concept even fur-
ther. Taking account of our divided past, it institutionalizes in-
terdependence between all parties to the conflict, an aspect that
this Essay will comment on further below. Further, the Agree-
ment takes account of our close neighbors, notjust on the island
of Ireland, but, through the British-Irish Council, Scotland,
Wales, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. The Nordic
Council signposts the powerful potential of collaborating in such
a way, and the potential of a "Celtic Crescent" on the edge of
Europe must surely be recognized.
It would be foolish not to recognize, though, that there are
a number of current blockages. Decommissioning is one such
focal point. In our view it is not necessary for decommissioning
to begin in advance of the formation of an executive. And, at
the time of this writing, there is an almost tangible need for peo-
ple to begin realizing the fruits of their historic vote in May. De-
mands for prior decommissioning cannot be allowed to hold up
the full implementation of the Agreement. The Agreement can-
not be rewritten or renegotiated. If it is suggested that it can, it
contributes to mistrust, further marginalizes those holding arms
together with their political affiliates, and thus reduces the likeli-
hood of any decommissioning. Decommissioning requires the
fostering of trust. It will take until May 2000 for this to happen.
Other political developments add to this climate. Just as the
NIWC argued that the deal could not be a deal of the center, so
too, in our view, the process of implementation should not be
conducted by the big "center" parties, even though, technically,
the Agreement provides for specific parts to be brought forward
by particular actors. It tasks, for instance, the British and Irish
governments to bring forward some parts, an Independent Com-
mission on Policing to bring forward others, and the First and
Deputy First Ministers designate to implement other areas of the
multi-faceted document. The penchant for the parties of the
center to embark on bilateral implementation courses leads to
an actual and perceived sense of exclusion. Asserting the pri-
macy of the center lends to the further marginalization of those
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political groupings whose members have close links or associa-
tions with paramilitary groupings and undermines the complex-
ity of the nationalist and unionist communities.
The recent, post-Agreement discussion over the number
and nature of the new departments is a case in point. After pre-
liminary consultations with the other parties, the SDLP and UUP
set off together to come up with a deal on the nature of the new
administration. There are conflicting reports about what was ac-
tually agreed, or not agreed, between them before an eventual
joint position was reached. The process point is that if other
parties had been privy to the discussions, the veracity of any one
party's claims could have been attested, the quality of the deci-
sion might have been improved, and, importantly, it would have
been more difficult for any one party to walk away from such a
deal.
This also raises the issue of implementation of any accord.
In the middle of the final week's negotiations that eventually
produced the Agreement, we recall bumping into a woman dele-
gate from one of the unionist parties. "God," she commented,
"this is like being in the middle of a really long labor with no
epidermal!" We laughed, and rushed on, enjoying the lightness
of the moment in an otherwise austere atmosphere. On reflec-
tion, it was a perfect analogy, and one that still rings true. If we
develop it, we can identify where the care gaps are. You don't
give birth to anything and then expect the offspring to be able to
care for itself. So it is with the Agreement. There has not been
the same care and attention invested in the nurturing and em-
bedding of the Agreement as there was in its production. Nego-
tiation does not end at the signing, the referendum result, or at
the elections. The Agreement was like getting a twenty-gear
racer as a first bicycle. We need some sustained assistance in
learning to ride-stabilizers of some kind-and when we know
the basics, in learning how to operate the gears. It is only then
that we should discard the stabilizers. Thus, the continuing in-
terest and interventions of President Clinton, Prime Minster
Blair, Secretary of State Mowlam, and Taoiseach Ahern have
proved critical in implementing the Agreement, but the realities
of how much dedicated time and energy they can commit have
to be raised.
This points to greater malaise in the wake of the Agree-
ment. It is all very well making political calls about how many
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portfolios of government there should be, and establishing the
type of institutional interdependence of the Agreement, but the
transition process needs to be tackled more broadly and deeply
than at an institutional level alone. Richard Jay notes that "dem-
ocratic structures which merely appear to circulate political lead-
ers without addressing substantial social concerns will not only
fail to incorporate the dispossessed into the political community,
but encourage others to drop out and pursue methods inimical
to the democratic spirit."31
The NIWC supports the explicit incorporation of the two
major traditions in certain voting procedures and implementa-
tion elements, though we would have argued for the triple lock
that applied in the Talks process-not just a majority in both
traditions, but also a majority of parties around the table. It is
only right that we acknowledge the conflict that continues to fes-
ter in our structures. The NIWC believes that there needs to be
a holistic management of this society out of conflict and division
into real democracy. We need to build the capacity in our com-
munities to build peace in parallel with the discussions on the
structural components such as the Assembly and accompanying
administrative concerns, the North/South Ministerial Council,
the British-Irish Council, or the incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Power-sharing has to happen within and outside the polit-
ical elites, otherwise one runs the risk of a political version of
Galbraith's "culture of contentment."32 In a political vacuum, or
even political uncertainty, sectarianism foments, and the weekly
riots and nightly skirmishes in Portadown-the backdrop to the
Drumcree marching crisis-is providing evidence of, and prime
conditions for, such growth at the moment. Crude crisis man-
agement will not progress us far; we need to begin managing this
transition in a broad based and inclusive way. One of the find-
ings from the research conducted by the "Yes" campaign was
that, paradoxically given our rigid voting patterns, people re-
sponded very positively to politicians acting collectively-collab-
orating for the common good. An exclusive implementation
31. Richard Jay, Richard Democratic Dilemmas, in SOCIAL EXCLUSION, SOCIAL INCLU-
SION (Robin Wilson ed., Democratic Dialogue, Nov. 1995).
32. The Good Society Considered: The Economic Dimension, J. L. & Soc'v (Cardiff 1994).
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process at the structural level will not engender the same confi-
dence that an inclusive one would.
What about the areas of the Agreement that have no named
sponsor in terms of implementation? These tend to be the non-
structural elements-the padding-but are important because
they relate to strengthening the work of people on the ground
who have been holding communities together for many years.
The provisions on resourcing community development, on fol-
lowing economic policies that combat social exclusion and en-
gender active participation, on planning, building, and main-
taining mixed housing developments, and on the participation
of women-these all require a champion or champions and are
in danger of neglect. The impact of such neglect would have
serious political ramifications, not just for the areas neglected,
but for the greater political infrastructure established by the
Agreement.
The new glamor of high politics must not blind us to the
realities of our situation-that of a small region emerging from
a conflict that will take many years to put behind us. Whereas
interpersonal relationships will be crucial at the Assembly level,
their sustenance will depend on the state of intercommunal rela-
tionships on the ground. Politicians have the power, if they have
the courage, to address sectarianism and to develop policies for
tackling it.
The Good Friday Agreement, in its structural components,
does not differ substantially from many of the ideas presented
since the early 1970s.3 3 But there are three main differences be-
33. This assertion is best illustrated by a consideration of the constitutional guaran-
tee that accompanied every major drive to effect change or to preserve the status quo in
the Northern Ireland region. Prior to the Good Friday Agreement, unionists have been
issued with guarantees regarding the safety of their sovereign state in 1949, 1972, 1973,
1974, 1985, 1990, 1993, and 1995. For example, in 1972, the question of consent and
the relationship of the U.K government to Northern Ireland was housed in these
terms: "No UK government for many years has had any wish to impede the realisation
of Irish unity if it were to come about by genuine and freely given mutual agreement
and on conditions acceptable to the distinctive communities. Future of Northern Ireland
NIO, para. 77 (1972), cited in JOHN WHYrE, INTERPRETING NORTHERN IRELAND 140
(1990). The White Paper of March 1973 (Northern Ireland: Constitutional Proposals)
advanced Faulkner's powersharing initiative a little further, affording official U.K gov-
ernment recognition of the idea of consociational democracy over the majoritarianism
of the Stormont regime. The Northern Ireland Constitutional Act, which followed,
contained a change in the definition of who could change the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland. This was now to rest with the majority of the Northern Ireland popu-
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tween it and the earlier proposals: one, the process by which it
was produced; two, the inclusion of extra-structural components
addressing the impact of the conflict; and, three, the public en-
dorsement of the product. These combined offer the capacity to
truly transform the society in which we live. It is difficult to place
these in any hierarchy, but the following observations may be
useful.
The process that produced the Agreement went outside the
political elites for participants. Holding elections to determine
participants marked a radical departure for both the British and
Irish governments and for those who had been used to being
invited as of right to political discussions-the most recent being
the 1992 Mayhew Talks. Once established, the process defied all
the odds by flying in the face of theoretical writings on conflict
resolution and negotiating. Parties continually assigned blame
to other parties; many never acknowledged that they contributed
in any way to the current situation-it was always someone else's
fault; there was very little exploration of interests and much stat-
ing and rigorous defense of positions, with an allied reduced
range of options; very little listening, and much advocacy. To
top it all, tight negotiating teams fed a number of similar group
dynamics that reinforced self-perceptions and supported
prejudices. But the process was invaluably helped by the pres-
ence of the international independent chairs and both govern-
ments, who managed the mandated participants with seemingly
bottomless reserves of patience, skill, and commitment.
In relation to the many other documents that have at-
tempted to resolve the Irish question, the reason why this Agree-
ment will work is because it presented and utilized space in
which to create multiple options for mutual gain. The Massa-
chusetts-based Conflict Management Group suggests that it is
prudent to prepare for negotiation by generating as many op-
tions as possible. "It is in the interests of each side to be 'split-
ting a larger pie."'' 4  By including extra-structural compo-
nents-broadly the "rightsism," the basket of measures that ad-
dress the human impact of the conflict-the Agreement
lation, as opposed to the Northern Ireland Parliament (the only agent of change identi-
fied by the 1949 Act). This shift in power to consent to the state from the parliament
has not changed since 1973. The Good Friday Agreement does not alter the status or
nature of this agent who could redefine the territory of the United Kingdom.
34. Boston College, Conflict Management Group, Options, Mass. (1992).
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broadened the parameters of the question, created additional
value, increased the size of the pie, and then split it so that every-
body got more and bigger pieces. We suggest that it is precisely
these elements of the Agreement that set it apart from other set-
tlement proposition and that afford the ability to address the sec-
tarianism endemic to our society.
Because it paid attention to process, product, and public in-
volvement at every stage, the Agreement has the ability to truly
transform our conflict and to guide us to a wholly democratic,
fair, and equitable society in which all our citizens have a stake.
